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1  | INTRODUC TION
A commonly expressed fear in dystopian novels and popular debates 
about genetic engineering is that we will produce future people who 
are exactly alike. But part of the beauty of life is the astonishing di‐
versity that evolution has produced. Of course, evolution has also 
left us with genetic disorders like Huntington's disease that we'd be 
better off without. But the difference between eliminating simple 
genetic disorders and selecting non‐disease genes that influence 
psychological styles is big. For one thing, important aspects of our 
psychology ranging from general intelligence to specific personality 
traits like extraversion are polygenic—they result from many genes 
with small effects interacting with one another.1  For another, many 
traits that seem undesirable in some ways are desirable in others. 
Introversion, for example, may lead to less subjective well‐being 
than extraversion but also to artistic creation.2  To the extent that 
some traits might reduce subjective well‐being but have compensat‐
ing individual or social benefits, there are difficult ethical decisions 
about whether to preserve, reduce, or enhance them.
Science fiction raises a legitimate question: how do we preserve 
a diversity of people in a world in which parents can influence the 
genetic contributions to their children's personality? This question 
motivates the article. In Part 2 we review recent research that exam‐
ines the genetic basis of psychological traits, focusing on personality 
traits and political orientation. In Part 3 we review evidence for the 
1 Plomin,	R.,	&	Deary,	I.	J.	(2015).	Genetics	and	intelligence	differences:	Five	special	find‐
ings. Molecular Psychiatry, 20, 98–108.
2 Nettle,	D.	 (2006).	The	evolution	of	personality	variation	 in	humans	and	other	animals.	
American Psychologist,	61,	622–631.
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Abstract
It is likely that gene editing technologies will become viable in the current century. As 
scientists uncover the genetic contribution to personality traits and cognitive styles, 
parents will face hard choices. Some of these choices will involve trade‐offs from the 
standpoint of the individual's welfare, while others will involve trade‐offs between 
what is best for each and what is good for all. Although we think we should generally 
defer to the informed choices of parents about what kinds of children to create, we 
argue that decisions to manipulate polygenic psychological traits will be much more 
ethically	complicated	than	choosing	Mendelian	traits	like	blood	type.	We	end	by	de‐
fending the principle of regulatory parsimony, which holds that when legislation is 
necessary to prevent serious harms, we should aim for simple rules that apply to all, 
rather than micro‐managing parental choices that shape the traits of their children. 
While	we	focus	on	embryo	selection	and	gene	editing,	our	arguments	apply	 to	all	
powerful technologies which influence the development of children.
K E Y W O R D S
cognitive diversity, embryo selection, gene editing, genetic enhancement, regulatory 
parsimony
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benefits of cognitive diversity for groups, and in Part 4 show how the 
development of enhancement technologies will lead to trade‐offs 
for	each	and	moral	dilemmas	for	all.	In	Part	5	we	consider	and	reject	
the claim that the existence of such trade‐offs generates reasons 
to abstain from intervening in ways that shape personality traits. In 
Part	6	we	introduce	our	favored	strategy—regulatory	parsimony.
2  | HERITABILIT Y OF PSYCHOLOGIC AL 
TR AITS
Scientists do not yet understand the precise role that genes play in the 
development of most psychological traits,3  so our discussion is specula‐
tive. But as the use of technology to select and alter embryos is likely to 
become ubiquitous, it is worth raising these issues before the science is 
complete. Behavioral genetics is the systematic study of how genes con‐
tribute to behavior, including behavior associated with personality type. It 
uses the comparison of monozygotic and dizygotic twins to infer the her‐
itability of traits.4  Behavioral genetics is an indirect way of understanding 
the genetic underpinnings of behavior in the absence of detailed knowl‐
edge of how genes shape behavior. As computational biology improves, 
we will learn more about the relationships between specific genetic vari‐
ants and the kinds of behavior they predispose us toward.
Although we will focus on the heritability of specific psychologi‐
cal traits we should first emphasize what is arguably the most im‐
portant determinant of health, wealth, and welfare: general 
intelligence.5  According to a widely shared view in quantitative psy‐
chology, “Intelligence is one of the best predictors of key outcomes 
such as education and occupational status. People with higher intel‐
ligence tend to have better mental and physical health and fewer ill‐
nesses throughout the life course, and longer lives.”6  Intelligence is 
also correlated with a range of other qualities, including patience and 
conscientiousness, which have a substantial impact on a host of life 
outcomes. Higher intelligence is negatively correlated with crime7  
and positively correlated with cooperation in strategic interactions 
that require patience and long‐term planning.8  It appears that intelli‐
gence is an all‐purpose good that many parents will want to enhance 
in their children, at least up to a point.9  But we want to focus on a 
neglected topic in the biomedical enhancement debate: specific psy‐
chological traits that are heritable and that may involve trade‐offs 
with other psychological traits.
2.1 | Personality traits
There are a variety of personality types in the human population, 
and nobody pretends we can neatly divide everyone into a few 
types. But the Big Five personality inventory is a widely used way to 
think about personality variation and the heritability of personality 
traits. The Big Five are openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism.
On most accounts, each of the Big Five has a substantial genetic 
component,	with	genes	accounting	for	an	average	of	about	40–60%	
of the variation between individuals in a population.10  The heritabil‐
ity	of	general	intelligence	is	closer	to	80%	by	adulthood.11  One impli‐
cation is that while environments matter, genetic influences on 
personality are powerful. Another is that intelligence and personal‐
ity can be sculpted—if not fully determined—by mate selection, em‐
bryo	selection,	and	(potentially)	genetic	engineering.
Extraversion generally has a positive connotation, while neuroti‐
cism has a negative connotation. But these are technical terms in 
psychology that reflect traits that can be described as good or bad 
for human welfare only in a broader context. So we should avoid 
thinking about the ordinary connotations of these terms, or their 
tendency to increase or reduce reproductive fitness in ancestral 
conditions, and instead focus on how they are likely to affect the 
welfare of people in the modern world. In the following few para‐
graphs we summarize some results from an overview of the Big Five 
by	Daniel	Nettle.12 
• Openness is associated with seeking novelty and making associa‐
tions between disparate domains. It is correlated positively with 
creativity but is also mildly associated with delusion, depression, 
and even schizophrenia;13  
• Conscientiousness is associated with the ability to delay gratifica‐
tion in the pursuit of goals. Conscientious people tend to be good 
at figuring out how to execute a plan, and they also tend to avoid 
antisocial behavior;
• Extraversion is associated with having an active social life, and 
seeking out new opportunities. It is also associated with having 
more sexual partners. These traits confer benefits, but they also 
tend to increase the risk of danger, and indeed, in the modern 
3 We	use	“psychological	traits”	as	a	general	term	that	includes	specific	cognitive	abilities,	
personality traits, and affective dispositions.
4 The	best	general	discussion	of	heritability	is	Sesardic,	N.	(2005).	Making sense of heritabil-
ity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
5 Sandberg,	A.,	&	Savulescu,	J.	(2011).	The	social	and	economic	impacts	of	cognitive	en‐
hancement.	In	J.	Savulescu,	R.	Ter	Meulen,	&	G.	Kahane,	(Eds.),	Enhancing human capacities 
(pp.	92–112).	Oxford:	Wiley‐Blackwell.
6 Plomin	&	Deary,	op	cit.	note	1,	p.	99.
7 Beaver,	K.,	Schwartz,	J.	A.,	Nedelec,	J.	L.,	Connolly,	E.	J.,	Boutwell,	B.	B.,	&	Barnese,	J.	C.	
(2013).	 Intelligence	 is	 associated	 with	 criminal	 justice	 processing.	 Intelligence, 41(5),	
277–288.
8 Jones,	G	(2008).	Are	smarter	groups	more	cooperative?	Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization, 68(3–4),	489–497.
9 Apart	from	the	private	reasons	parents	have,	if	general	intelligence	has	positive	network	
effects, predicting social trust and cooperation, there may be good moral reasons to en‐
hance	 intelligence	 (Anomaly	 &	 Jones,	 Cognitive	 enhancement	 and	 network	 effects;	 in	
preparation).
10 Bouchard,	T.	(2004).	Genetic	influence	on	human	psychological	traits.	Current Directions 
in Psychological Science, 13(4):	 148–151;	 Polderman,	 T.,	 Benyamin,	 B.,	 de	 Leeuw,	 C.	 A.,	
Sullivan,	P.	F.,	van	Bochoven,	A.,	Visscher,	P.…	Posthuma,	D.	(2015).	Meta‐analysis	of	the	
heritability of traits based on fifty years of twin studies. Nature Genetics, 47(),	702–712.
11 Haier,	R.	(2016).	The neuroscience of intelligence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12 Op	cit.	note	2.
13 The	association	seems	to	be	genetic:	Close	relatives	of	schizophrenics	are	more	likely	to	
be	in	creative	professions.	See	Plomin,	R.	(2018).	Blueprint: How DNA makes us who we are. 
New	York:	Penguin,	p.	151.
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world	extraversion	 is	positively	 (though	weakly)	correlated	with	
being involved in criminal or antisocial behavior;
• Agreeableness is associated with empathy and trust, and with 
harmonious personal relationships. People who score high on 
conscientiousness and agreeableness tend to be good friends, 
and good partners in coalitions, in part because they pay atten‐
tion to the needs of others, and can be counted on to stick to the 
agreements they make. The main downsides to conscientiousness 
and agreeableness is that they can make an individual liable to 
exploitation by free riders who seek to manipulate their trust and 
empathy;
•	 Neuroticism	is	associated	with	negative	emotional	attitudes	 like	
fear, guilt, anxiety, and depression. But neuroticism interacts with 
other traits in positive and negative ways. For example, when neu‐
roticism is paired with intelligence and conscientiousness, it can 
lead	to	achievement	in	professional	and	academic	settings.	When	
it is not, or when the environment stifles opportunities to exercise 
one's abilities, it can lead to crippling anxiety or depression.
2.2 | Pathological personality traits
2.2.1 | Scrupulosity
Many personality traits are healthy in moderate amounts but patho‐
logical in large amounts. For example, to the extent that social norms 
help members of groups coordinate their behavior, it's good for all if 
each member understands, follows, and enforces social norms. 
Enforcing a norm may seem like a prisoner's dilemma, as each en‐
forcer bears the cost of identifying and sanctioning those who vio‐
late rules, while the benefits of norm enforcement are dispersed 
among all members of a group. But natural selection seems to have 
partially solved the problem by equipping us with moral emotions 
that	motivate	us	to	follow	norms	and	sanction	norm	violators.	Guilt	
and shame make us inclined to punish ourselves for flouting socially 
beneficial rules and indignation leads us to want to punish others 
who break them.14 
But there is natural variation in people's propensity to follow and 
enforce norms. Some people have a strong propensity to punish rule 
violators and others have very little inclination to do so. It is socially 
beneficial to have norm enforcers in a population to promote coop‐
eration. But an extreme version of this personality trait, which psy‐
chopathologists call scrupulosity, occurs when some members of a 
group obsessively enforce rules, looking to punish every minor viola‐
tion with tough sanctions. This can make the individual who has the 
quality frustrated, especially when she fails to be able to understand 
that the spirit of the law is more important than the letter of the law. 
And it can make the group worse off as it's inefficient to have people 
devoting every bit of energy obsessing over rules rather than living a 
productive and happy life.
The excessively scrupulous person—an extreme form of con‐
scientiousness—cares too much about social conventions, treating 
them as intrinsically important and inflexible rather than a mallea‐
ble way of promoting social welfare. On the other side, people who 
are inclined to flout conventions can benefit a population. As some 
norms are oppressive, having some non‐conformists in a population 
will tend to promote social progress even if it's good for most peo‐
ple to follow rules that may increase predictability and harmony. But 
having an obsessive propensity to follow rules or having no concern 
for rules at all can be individually crippling and socially harmful.
2.2.2 | Autism
The characteristics of some people on the autistic spectrum may be 
another example of traits that are beneficial in moderate degrees 
but harmful in extreme degrees. Some of the diagnostic criteria of 
autism include a tendency to systematize and classify, a severely 
impaired ability to understand social cues, and relatively low levels 
of empathy.15  Some researchers have pointed out that these char‐
acteristics can be viewed as an extreme version of the male brain, 
which tends to excel at systematizing more than empathizing.16  
Couples who score relatively high on systematizing are more likely 
to have children with autistic qualities than those who don't.17  
While	severe	forms	of	autism	can	lead	to	a	life	of	dependence	and	
frustration, some of the genes that contribute to autism may con‐
tribute to a personality profile of someone with especially high abil‐
ity, particularly in engineering and mathematics.18  The presence of 
these personality traits in our society may contribute to important 
social goods.19 
Some psychologists have distinguished between cognitive em‐
pathy, which allows us to understand what other people are thinking, 
and affective empathy, which leads us to want to help other people 
who are in distress. People with low‐functioning autism often score 
low in both kinds of empathy. Others have challenged this view, ar‐
guing that most autistic people have affective empathy but test low 
on cognitive empathy.20 
2.2.3 | Psychopathy
In contrast, psychopaths excel in cognitive empathy, but lack a 
desire to help others unless it's to their own benefit. According 
to Simon Baron‐Cohen, “the psychopath is aware that they are 
hurting	 someone	because	 the	 ‘cognitive’	 (recognition)	element	
14 Bowles,	S.,	&	Gintis,	H.	(2011).	A cooperative species.	Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	
Press.
15 Baron‐Cohen,	S.	(2006).	Two	new	theories	of	autism:	Hyper‐systematizing	and	assorta‐
tive mating. Archives of Disease in Childhood, 91(1),	2–5.
16 Ploeger,	A.,	&	Galis,	F.	(2011).	Evolutionary	approaches	to	autism—an	overview	and	inte‐
gration. McGill Journal of Medicine, 13(2),	38.
17 Op	cit.	note	15.
18 Baron‐Cohen,	S.	(2012).	Zero degrees of empathy: A new theory of human cruelty and kind-
ness.	New	York:	Penguin,	p.	98.
19 Gyngell,	C.,	&	Douglas,	T.	(2018).	Selecting	against	disability:	The	liberal	eugenic	chal‐
lenge and the argument from cognitive diversity. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 35(2),	
319–340.
20 Mazza,	 M.,	 Pino,	 M.	 C.,	 Mariano,	 M.,	 Tempesta,	 D.,	 Ferrara,	 M.,	 De	 Berardis,	 D.,	 …	
Valenti,	M.	(2014).	Affective	and	cognitive	empathy	in	adolescents	with	autistic	spectrum	
disorder. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7(8),	791.
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of empathy is intact in their case, even if the ‘affective’ element 
(the	emotional	response	to	someone	else's	feelings)	is	not".21 
Psychopaths are dangerous because they understand how to get 
what they want, and manipulate others in the process, but don't care 
about the pain they inflict on other people. Psychopathy is highly her‐
itable and, like most character traits, polygenic.22  At the opposite 
end of psychopathy, people with very high levels of affective em‐
pathy —strongly influenced by genes and hormones— are more 
susceptible to anorexia, bipolar disorder, and schizophrenia.23  
2.3 | Political orientation
It may seem odd to argue that political orientation is heritable. 
After all, plenty of people hold completely different political 
views from their parents or siblings. But it is important to under‐
stand that all personality traits are heritable to some degree, and 
some traits incline us more toward some political ideologies than 
others.	Jonathan	Haidt	summarizes	the	process	by	saying:	genes	
make brains, which come pre‐wired with personality traits; traits 
lead children to take different life paths, and these different paths 
lead us to construct life narratives that fit a non‐random subset of 
the available political ideologies.24  This should not be surprising 
as politics is a human construct: our political ideologies reflect 
what we care about and how we tend to view the world. In fact, 
the heritability of political orientation tends to grow after young 
adults leave home because this is when they have the greatest 
capacity to seek out and mold environments that accord with 
their innate predispositions.25 	While	 parents	 can	 strongly	 influ‐
ence their children's political orientation when they're young, 
these effects tend to dissipate as their children increasingly 
choose environments and ideologies that match their personality 
better.
In thinking about how genes influence political orientation:
[T]he most likely answer is not that attitudes on spe‐
cific issues are heritable, but that issue positions re‐
flect a set of heritable core predispositions, including 
values and personality traits. These core predisposi‐
tions, which are influenced by life experiences as well 
as genes, are used by individuals to navigate the so‐
cial, economic, and political worlds and as such serve 
as the basis for specific attitudes on issues of the 
day.26 
Genes	that	influence	political	orientation	are	an	example	of	genetic	
factors that affect phenotypes via “outside the skin” pathways.27  They 
influence the way we move through our social and cultural environ‐
ments, which in turn change the specific values and ideologies we 
adopt.
To some extent, the Big Five correlate with political orientation. 
For example, a liberal political orientation strongly correlates with 
the personality trait of openness.28  But the best evidence so far is 
that political orientation is a separate dimension of personality.29  
Like other personality traits, “most researchers consider political 
traits to be influenced by thousands of genetic markers both indi‐
rectly and through interactions with numerous environmental stim‐
uli and other genes.”30 
Behavioral geneticists have pointed out that assortative mating—
the tendency to choose long‐term mates with similar psychological 
traits—is especially high for intelligence,31  and may be growing in 
countries in which women are free to become professionals and 
where professionals are more likely to marry each other than to 
marry people with lower status jobs.
Perhaps more striking than assortative mating for intelligence, 
“long‐term	mates	correlate	more	highly	on	political	ideologies	(.65–
.71)	 than	on	almost	any	other	clinical,	behavioral,	or	psychological	
trait.”32  Some worry that an increase in assortative mating for polit‐
ical orientation may exacerbate the political divide.33  But the strong 
correlation for political orientation may not be as worrisome as it 
seems. It may be that the correlation between long‐term mates and 
political orientation is not explained simply by the fact that partners 
have similar personality traits. It may partly be explained by the fact 
that in many places political orientation is a kind of ethnic marker, 
like race and religion. In fact, there is evidence that in the USA today 
people are at least as likely to discriminate against others of a differ‐
ent political party than against others of a different race or reli‐
gion.34  It is conceivable that quick and accurate gene sequencing 
21 Op	cit.	note	18,	p.	85;	Correction	added	on	25	April	2019,	after	first	publication:	The	
preceding quotation was previously wrong and has been corrected in this version.
22 Tuvblad,	C.,	Bezdjian,	S.,	Raine,	A.,	&	Baker,	L.	A.	(2014).	The	heritability	of	psychopathic	
personality	 in	14–15	year	old	twins:	A	multirater,	multimeasure	approach.	Psychological 
Assessment, 26(3),	704–716.	
23 Warrier,	V.,	Toro	R.,	Chakrabarti	B.,	iPSYCH‐Broad	autism	group,	Børglum	A.	D.,	Grove	
J.,	 …	 Baron‐Cohen,	 S.	 (2018).	 Genome‐wide	 analyses	 of	 self‐reported	 empathy.	
Translational Psychiatry, 8(1),	35.
24 Haidt,	J.	(2012).	The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. 
New	York:	Vintage,	Chapter	12.
25 Hatemi,	P.,	&	McDermott,	R.	(2012).	The	genetics	of	politics:	Discovery,	challenges,	and	
progress. Trends in Genetics, 28(10),	525–533.
26 Funk,	C.,	Smith,	K.	B.,	Alford,	J.	R.,	Hibbing,	M.	V.	Eaton,	N.	R.,	Krueger,	R.	F.	…	&	Hibbing,	
J.	 R.	 (2013).	 Genetic	 and	 environmental	 transmission	 of	 political	 orientations.	 Political 
Psychology, 34(6),	805–819,	p.	806.
27 Kendler,	K.,	&	Ralph,	G.	(2006).	The	nature	of	genetic	influences	on	behavior:	Lessons	
from “simpler” organisms. American Journal of Psychiatry, 163(10),	1687.
28 Op	cit.	note	24.
29 Hatemi,	P.,	Medland,	S.	E.,	Klemmensen,	R.,	Oskarsson,	S.,	Littvay,	L.,	Dawes,	C.	T.	…	
Martin,	N.	G.	(2014).	Genetic	influences	on	political	ideologies:	Twin	analyses	of	19	mea‐
sures of political ideologies from five democracies and genome‐wide findings from three 
populations. Behavioral Genetics, 44(3),	282–294.
30 Op	cit.	note	25,	p.	527.
31 Op	cit.	note	1.
32 Op	cit.	note	25,	p.	527.
33 Alford,	J.,	Funk,	C.	L.,	&	Hibbing,	J.	R.	(2005).	Are	political	orientations	genetically	trans‐
mitted? American Political Science Review, 99(2),	165.
34 Iyengar,	S.,	&	Westwood,	S.	(2015).	Fear	and	loathing	across	party	lines:	New	evidence	
on group polarization. American Journal of Political Science, 59(3),	690–707.
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combined with embryo selection or gene editing technology could 
increase the genetic basis of existing political divides.
We	have	tried	to	give	an	overview	of	how	different	psycholog‐
ical traits are both heritable and capable of producing different life 
outcomes	and	sociopolitical	arrangements.	We	now	want	to	explore	
why cognitive diversity is desirable, and what kinds of trade‐offs we 
might face in selecting or altering embryos to shape our children's 
traits.
3  | THE VALUE OF COGNITIVE DIVERSIT Y
A number of authors have emphasized that if we want to solve a 
complex problem it is often better to have a cognitively diverse 
group of people than the same number of very bright people who 
see the world in a similar way.35  This insight is perhaps best captured 
by	William	Buckley's	quip	that	he'd	“rather	entrust	the	government	
of the United States to the first 400 people listed in the Boston tel‐
ephone directory than to the faculty of Harvard University.”36  
People with different experiences and different cognitive styles 
(which	arise	 from	a	confluence	of	psychological	 traits),	 look	at	 the	
world through different lenses that can complement one another. 
And as long as they are organized in teams or in groups that com‐
municate and cooperate effectively their different talents can be 
harnessed to solve complex problems.
Apart	 from	 simple	 teamwork,	 Jonathan	 Haidt	 has	 given	 some	
reason to believe that people with diverse cognitive styles may be 
better at solving political problems.37  For example, people with con‐
servative personalities tend to be skeptical of outsiders and of radi‐
cal new ways of organizing political society and liberals tend to be 
more open to alternatives to the existing arrangements. A healthy 
proportion of liberals in a population can help a group learn from 
outsiders	and	allow	people	to	try	out	new	experiments	in	living	(to	
paraphrase	John	Stuart	Mill).	But	conservatives	may	have	a	benefi‐
cial influence in pressing the brakes when radical alternatives are 
likely to expose a group to danger.38 
Similarly, cognitive diversity can combine with open societies to 
produce salutary social effects. Mill argued that even people who 
are content with the status quo often benefit from new ways of 
thinking and models of living:
Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds 
cannot feel the use of [.… But] recollecting that noth‐
ing was ever yet done which someone was not the 
first to do, and that all good things which exist are the 
fruits of originality, let them be modest enough to be‐
lieve that there is something still left for it to accom‐
plish, and assure themselves that they are more in 
need of originality, the less they are conscious of the 
want.39 
While	Mill's	point	is	about	originality	and	eccentricity,	these	are	at	
least partly shaped by different psychological traits as well as different 
environments.	Diversity	is	good,	on	this	view,	to	the	extent	that	it	can	
help us solve political problems and come up with cultural and scien‐
tific	innovations	that	benefit	everyone.	More	recently,	Jerry	Gaus	has	
extended Mill's insight to argue that some degree of moral diversity, 
which is tied to cognitive diversity, can help populations solve social 
and political problems that arise in response to an increasingly complex 
world.40 	It	is	important,	though,	not	to	overplay	this	point.	Radical	di‐
versity of values in a population is likely to undermine trust and impair 
successful collective action.41 	What	is	important	is	that	there	is	some	
optimum range of diversity.42 
Finally, quite apart from their instrumental effects on solving 
political problems and generating new ideas in the arts and sciences, 
aesthetic and personality differences can make life more enjoyable 
(at	 least	 within	 certain	 parameters:	 having	 more	 psychopaths	
in the population or people with severe autism is not especially 
desirable).
Given	 the	 value	of	 diversity,	 and	 assuming	 there	 is	 some	 ge‐
netic contribution to it, we want to explore two kinds of trade‐
offs. First, the trade‐offs that parents will face in choosing a child 
with different traits when they are concerned only with the child's 
welfare; and second, the trade‐offs parents will face between se‐
lecting or altering children in a way that is likely to affect the wel‐
fare of society more generally. The total effects of such trade‐offs 
may be small and difficult to predict for any given child. But from a 
social standpoint, the aggregate effects of many such choices are 
significant.
4  | ENHANCEMENT DILEMMA S
Suppose we gain the power to alter embryos before they develop 
into	children.	Versions	of	gene	editing	technology	such	as	CRISPR	
Cas9 already promise to make genetic engineering a reality in the 
35 Hong,	L.,	&	Page,	S.	(2004).	Groups	of	diverse	problem	solvers	can	outperform	groups	of	
high ability problem solvers. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America, 101(46),	16385–16389.
36 Wakefield,	D.	(1961).	William	F.	Buckley:	Portrait	of	a	complainer.	New	York:	Esquire.
37 Op	cit.	note	24.
38 Conservatives	also	tend	to	emphasize	values	and	family	structures	that	have	historically	
fostered above replacement‐level fertility, whereas liberal societies have seen their num‐
bers plummeting to sub‐replacement levels. As Filipe Faria has argued, market liberalism 
may be creating a self‐defeating pattern of fertility declines in the most prosperous soci‐
eties. This is not necessarily an argument for returning to a more conservative society, but 
it may be yet another interesting trade‐off between groups comprised of people with 
different	values	and	cognitive	 traits.	See	Faria,	F.	 (2017).	 Is	market	 liberalism	adaptive?	
Journal of Bioeconomics, 19(3),	307–326.
39 Mill,	J.	S.	(1859).	On	Liberty:	Reprinted	in	New	York	by	Penguin,	Chapter	3.
40 Gaus,	G.	(2018).	The	complexity	of	a	diverse	moral	order.	Georgetown Journal of Law and 
Public Policy, 16(S).
41 Ostrom,	 E.	 (2000).	 Collective	 action	 and	 the	 evolution	 of	 social	 norms.	 Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 14(3),	137–158.
42 Kahane,	G.,	&	Savulescu,	J.	(2014).	Normal	variation:	Refocusing	the	enhancement	de‐
bate. Bioethics, 29(2),	133–143.
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near future, even if we're a long way off from manipulating poly‐
genic psychological traits.43  Assuming this technology becomes 
widely available, we will face a number of hard choices. Even if 
gene editing does not progress, whole genome analysis of embryos 
is now possible and genetic selection for psychological traits is on 
the horizon. And there will be other technological and social means 
of	 modifying	 a	 child's	 personality	 (such	 as	 pharmaceuticals	 and	
medical	devices).	We	will	assume	(rather	than	defend)	two	princi‐
ples: procreative beneficence and procreative altruism. Although 
there are plenty of philosophical objections to these principles we 
will take them for granted in order to explore what they might 
imply about parental choices that may shape the characteristics of 
children.
According to the principle of procreative beneficence44  par‐
ents should select the child, of the children they could have, who 
is	expected	to	live	the	best	life	possible	(in	terms	of	well‐being),	
given the available information. According to the principle of pro‐
creative altruism45  prospective parents have a moral reason to 
have a child whose existence can be expected to contribute more 
to the well‐being of others than any alternative child they could 
have.	We	recognize	that	the	two	principles	can	come	into	conflict,	
and that people who hold both principles will give them different 
weights.	We	also	recognize	that	procreative	choices	involve	other	
values, including the interests of parents and family. But we focus 
on procreative beneficence and altruism to illustrate the kinds of 
social dilemmas that widespread access to genetic modification 
and	 selection	 could	 create.	 We	 do	 not	 assume	 parents	 always	
know all of the relevant risks and benefits of procreative choices 
but we do assume that they have strong moral reasons to inform 
themselves of the science and moral trade‐offs their decisions 
involve.
4.1 | Trade‐offs between mutually exclusive traits
As we argued above, some cognitive traits exist on a spectrum and 
some may be mutually exclusive. For example, some studies suggest 
that individuals who perform badly on tests that measure latent inhi‐
bition	(an	ability	to	block	out	irrelevant	stimuli)	do	well	on	tests	of	
creativity, and vice versa.46  In other words, these traits may be to 
some extent mutually exclusive—people are creative precisely be‐
cause their mind wanders and they cannot block out seemingly ir‐
relevant information.47 
Assume it becomes possible to manipulate genes or select em‐
bryos in ways that influence these traits. Parents will face a tough 
choice. Being able to block out irrelevant details and concentrate 
is valuable in some circumstances and being creative is valuable in 
others.	Whether	either	trait	 is	good	for	someone	is	highly	context	
dependent. This trade‐off makes it hard to apply procreative benefi‐
cence, as it is difficult for parents to pick the trait that will be overall 
best for their child. This trade‐off also makes it hard to apply procre‐
ative altruism. It seems likely that society benefits from having a mix 
of people who are creative and people who have good latent inhibi‐
tion.	Without	knowing	how	other	parents	will	act	it	is	hard	to	know	
how to promote collective welfare when altering this trait.
Other traits may fit this pattern. For example, consider the 
trade‐off that exists between systemizing and empathy discussed 
above. Because each end of the spectrum is good in different cir‐
cumstances and we do not know the exact circumstances facing our 
children, it is difficult to promote individual and collective welfare 
by	altering	them.	When	we	generalize	from	a	two‐person	game	to	
a choice faced by billions of people the optimal population mix be‐
comes harder to figure out, and—even if it were discoverable—nearly 
impossible to achieve.
4.2 | Trade‐offs between individually beneficial 
traits and collectively beneficial traits
Some psychological traits are clearly beneficial to individuals but will 
be collectively bad if possessed by all. Consider the choice to alter an 
embryo in a way that makes the child more extraverted. As indicated 
above, extraversion is heritable and people who score high on meas‐
ures of extraversion tend to have better social relationships, are less 
prone to depression, and enjoy success in many different profes‐
sions	(most	obviously,	business).	Extraverts	are	likely	to	be	a	bit	hap‐
pier, more effective in communicating to other members of a team, 
and better public speakers. They are also likely to make more money 
if their extraversion is combined with conscientiousness and high 
general intelligence.48  So it seems obvious that most parents moti‐
vated to improve the well‐being of their child would choose to make 
them extraverted.
Yet	it's	also	plausible	that	having	some	introverts	in	a	population	
is good for collective well‐being. Introverts are especially good at 
problem‐solving on their own—i.e., synthesizing and distilling infor‐
mation from collaborative work when they are alone.49  To illustrate 
why a combination of extraverts and introverts can be beneficial, 
consider the story of Apple Computers. Apple Computers was co‐
founded	 by	 an	 introvert,	 Steve	Wozniak,	 and	 an	 extravert,	 Steve	
Jobs.	Wozniak	was	a	more	traditional	computer	geek—an	introverted	
systematizer—while	Jobs	was	a	businessman	with	a	creative	vision—
an extraverted showman. Both made crucial contributions to the 
company's success and to the development and adoption of personal 
computers. Their different cognitive styles worked together to the 
43 Op	cit.	note	13,	p.	116.
44 Savulescu,	J.	(2001).	Procreative	beneficence:	Why	we	should	select	the	best	children.	
Bioethics, 15(5–6),	413–426.
45 Douglas,	 T.,	 &	 Devolder,	 K.	 (2013).	 Procreative	 altruism.	 Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy, 38(4),	400–419.
46 Carson,	S.,	&	Peterson,	J.,	&	Higgins,	D.	(2003).	Decreased	latent	inhibition	is	associated	
with increased creative achievement in high‐functioning individuals. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 85(3),	499–506.
47 Gyngell,	C.,	&	Easteal,	S.	(2015).	Cognitive	diversity	and	moral	enhancement.	Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 24(1),	66–74.
48 Gensowski,	 M.	 (2018).	 Personality,	 IQ,	 and	 lifetime	 earnings.	 Labour Economics, 51, 
170–183.
49 Cain,	S.	(2013).	Quiet: The power of introverts in a world that can't stop talking.	New	York:	
Broadway.
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overall benefit of the company, the company's customers and the 
broader population.
The possibility of influencing traits along the introversion‐extra‐
version spectrum is therefore likely to lead to a dilemma between 
what	is	good	for	each	(procreative	beneficence)	and	what	is	good	for	
all	(procreative	altruism).	To	the	extent	that	we	think	both	principles	
matter, regardless of whether we agree about how much they mat‐
ter, this is a deep social dilemma. If everyone acts with the interest 
of their own children in mind it produces a result that is collectively 
suboptimal, assuming that procreative altruism has some non‐trivial 
weight.	 In	other	words,	what	 is	good	for	each	may	not	be	best	 (or	
even	reasonably	good)	for	all.
Similar dilemmas will arise for many other traits. Consider the 
choice to alter our children's genes to make them more compassion‐
ate than they would otherwise be. If everyone chose to engineer 
more	 compassionate	 (or	 affectively	 empathetic)	 children	 perhaps	
violence would decrease and altruism would increase. Other things 
equal, procreative altruism suggests this would be desirable. But 
from the standpoint of procreative beneficence there might be 
trade‐offs for children engineered in this way—for example, more 
compassionate people might lose some of the drive to achieve great 
things for themselves, like Olympic medals or artistic creations. 
However, suppose that a world in which everyone was highly com‐
passionate would be best for all because of increased trust and re‐
duced violence. Assuming this, procreative altruism implies we have 
reasons to select for highly compassionate children. However, if ev‐
eryone were highly compassionate, this creates an incentive for de‐
fectors. People who are much more selfish than average may be able 
to thrive, benefiting from the trust and good will of others and giv‐
ing little in return. In these circumstances procreative beneficence 
would instruct parents to produce children who are less compas‐
sionate. But if everyone acted like this it would be impartially worse 
for all. There is a coordination problem here. The best impartial re‐
sult, from the standpoint of procreative altruism, can be produced 
only if everyone acts together—but this is beyond a parent's control.
In other words, in these simple and stylized examples there is no 
reason to expect the set of individual procreative choices to produce 
a social optimum. And there is no reason to assume that people will 
converge in their moral judgments about precisely what that opti‐
mum is, even if we can assume everyone will endorse procreative 
beneficence and procreative altruism. In sum, the ability to alter psy‐
chological traits will expose parents to a range of practical dilem‐
mas involving trade‐offs. This raises the question of how we should 
regulate and protect cognitive diversity in an age of whole genome 
analysis, embryo selection, and gene editing.
5  | THE NATUR AL LOT TERY IS UNFAIR
In the face of this problem it might be tempting to ban genetic selec‐
tion	or	enhancement.	Even	if	such	a	ban	were	effective	(which	we	
have reason to doubt, given strong demand and the global reach of 
black	markets),	this	would	leave	the	balance	of	traits	in	the	hands	of	
the natural lottery. However, there is no reason to believe that na‐
ture has afforded human populations with optimum levels of diver‐
sity. The current distribution of traits has been shaped by natural 
selection.	Natural	selection	works	to	promote	the	survival	of	 indi‐
viduals and genes. It does not aim to promote human well‐being or 
the collective good. It is clear that nature creates great inequality in 
traits that are relevant both at the level of personal and social wel‐
fare. There is no good reason to believe that normal human variation 
is optimal for the outcomes that matter.50 	Nor	is	there	good	reason	
to believe that leaving such choices to parents will be worse. At very 
least, parents are more likely than the natural lottery to promote 
their children's well‐being.
Furthermore, technological development is rapidly changing the 
environments to which humans are exposed. The way we interact 
with our environment today is very different from that just a few 
centuries ago. This has produced the problem of evolutionary mis‐
match, one version of which occurs when traits that were adaptive in 
ancestral conditions fail to promote either survival or well‐being in 
our current environment.51  For example, a person who scores high 
on neuroticism may very well have produced more surviving off‐
spring, or contributed to the welfare of his tribe in an environment in 
which predators are a constant threat. Having an extreme fear of 
bugs or being disposed to worry about whether we've adequately 
prepared for the long winter ahead would be likely to be rewarded. 
But high levels of neuroticism today can result in clinical depression 
or anorexia.52 	Natural	 selection	 is	 a	 slow	process	 that	works	over	
several generations. Hence it is unlikely that it has equipped individ‐
uals or populations with the balance of personality traits that best 
promotes our flourishing today.
6  | REGUL ATORY PARSIMONY
There is no way to avoid the questions raised in the previous sec‐
tions. Failing to confront technologies that already enable us to se‐
lect embryos, and will soon allow us to edit them is not a promising 
strategy, nor does it seem morally justifiable. Thinking about what 
kinds of people will exist and how we will create them is arguably our 
most important moral obligation.53  Some authors have argued that 
when the freedom to choose our children's characteristics creates a 
collective action problem, there is a prima facie case for government 
intervention.54  In a sense this is right: we cannot expect undirected 
private choice magically to produce an optimal distribution of goods 
50 Op.	cit	note	42.
51 Cofnas,	 N.	 (2016).	 A	 teleofunctional	 account	 of	 evolutionary	 mismatch.	 Biology and 
Philosophy, 31,	507–525.
52 Lieberman,	D.	(2013).	The story of the human body.	New	York:	Vintage,	Chapter	7.
53 Savulescu,	J.,	&	Kahane,	G.	 (2009).	The	moral	obligation	to	produce	children	with	the	
best chance of the best life. Bioethics, 23(5),	274–290;	Gyngell,	C.,	&	Selgelid,	M.	(2016).	
Twenty‐first	century	eugenics.	In	L.	Francis	(Ed.),	The Oxford handbook of reproductive eth-
ics	(pp.	141–158).Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press;	Anomaly,	J.	(2018).	Defending	eugen‐
ics: From cryptic choice to conscious selection. Monash Bioethics Review, 35(1–4),	24–35.
54 Gyngell,	C.,	&	Douglas,	T.	(2015).	Stocking	the	genetic	supermarket:	Reproductive	ge‐
netic technologies and collective action problems. Bioethics, 29(4),	241–250.
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in an economy or traits in a population. But we should always con‐
trast whatever failures we expect from individual choice with the 
predictable failures of government intervention.55  In fact, the di‐
chotomy between undirected individual choice and coercive govern‐
ment rules is misleading. Social norms are important sources of 
social order and can deeply affect our individual preferences.
When	we	think	about	social	interactions	with	many	players	and	
multiple equilibria, norms and laws can be thought of as rival ways of 
moving	us	from	one	equilibrium	to	another	(socially	superior)	equi‐
librium. In small groups whose members have common values, low 
monitoring costs, and limited migration, collective action problems 
are typically best solved through informal norms. But in the kinds 
of collective action problems we're envisioning, millions of people in 
nation‐states and potentially billions of people around the world will 
be interacting in complex games that occur across time and space. In 
some cases, parents will move between different states or they will 
move between different communities within a state. The conditions 
for social norms to solve collective action problems will not always 
apply in these cases, unless people return to living in small and sta‐
ble communities where norms can more powerfully sculpt behavior, 
including reproductive preferences.
This makes it hard to know what to do about far‐reaching col‐
lective action problems—for example, those that arise because 
many parents may prefer extraverts to introverts, or because all 
would prefer a population with more empathy, but each would pre‐
fer a child with less empathy than average. There is no algorithm 
that can tell us when we should rely on norms or laws to solve col‐
lective actions problems, though there are general rules of thumb 
that we can glean when we distinguish small number from large 
number cases, or cases with extensive externalities from those in 
which the consequences of our choices are mostly internalized.56 
We	want	 to	 explore	what	Amy	Gutmann	 calls	 the	 principle	 of	
regulatory parsimony, which she coined as a response to the kinds of 
collective action problems that arise with genetic engineering in par‐
ticular, and synthetic biology more generally. Synthetic biology in‐
volves the use of computation and molecular biology to create and 
alter life.57  Some of the main uses include manipulating phage vi‐
ruses capable of replacing antibiotics to fight bacterial infections, 
creating gene drives to eradicate vectors for infectious diseases, res‐
urrecting	 extinct	 species,	 and	 altering	 the	 DNA	 of	 our	 children.	
According	to	Amy	Gutmann,	regulatory	parsimony	in	the	context	of	
synthetic biology recommends
[O]nly as much oversight as is truly necessary to en‐
sure justice, fairness, security, and safety while pursu‐
ing	the	public	good.	Regulatory	parsimony	is	especially	
important in emerging technologies […] where the 
temptation to stifle innovation on the basis of uncer‐
tainty and fear of the unknown is particularly great. 
The blunt instruments of statutory and regulatory re‐
straint may not only inhibit the distribution of new 
benefits, but can be counterproductive to security 
and safety by preventing researchers from developing 
effective safeguards.58 
This is a vague principle. One way to clarify regulatory parsimony is 
to think of it as implying that when legislation is necessary to prevent 
serious harms that arise from coordination problems, we should aim for 
simple rules that apply to all. In the cases we have in mind we should 
avoid micromanaging parental choices that shape the traits of their chil‐
dren. There are a number of reasons to endorse this principle that are not 
discussed	by	Gutmann.	First,	complex laws are often harder for ordinary 
people and small firms to navigate than they are for powerful people and 
large corporations. Similarly, wealthy people can typically afford to travel 
great distances or pay high costs to obtain goods that black markets are 
likely to provide if demand is strong, and goods that are made either illegal 
or expensive due to complex or otherwise burdensome laws. Complex 
laws, then, can harm the smallest companies and most vulnerable people.
Second, too many laws can crowd out social norms, which tend to 
be more sensitive to local conditions than government legislation.59  
A small number of clear laws is less likely to stifle innovation. 
Innovation can occur both in the technology we seek to regulate but 
also in the norms and laws by which we might regulate the technol‐
ogy.	We	see	regulatory	parsimony	as	a	tacit	endorsement	of	federal‐
ism—the	idea	expressed	by	James	Madison	and	others	that,	although	
we occasionally need a few simple rules at the level of a national 
government or an international assembly, we should also ensure that 
we allow local communities to experiment with different ways of 
achieving the desired results.
Third, laws can reduce liberty. The principle of regulatory parsi‐
mony in politics is analogous to the principle of the least restrictive 
alternative in ethics. Taking the least restrictive alternative is good 
because of the intrinsic value of liberty, but also because autonomy 
is promoted when people are confronted with alternatives and en‐
couraged to develop the ability to make difficult decisions rather 
than	relying	on	others	to	do	so	for	them.	Just	as	too	many	pharma‐
ceutical regulations can result in a kind of learned helplessness by 
consumers,60  an overly paternalistic approach to regulating genetic 
engineering can lead to false confidence in the wisdom of regulators 
and to a stunted capacity to make informed choices.
Finally, political processes produce incentives that result in a 
non‐random set of people who end up as regulators. These people 
will tend to have their own parochial views about which traits matter 
most, and what composition of future people would be best. Some 
regulators may possess wisdom that those who they regulate lack. 
55 Anomaly,	J.	(2015).	Public	goods	and	government	action.	Politics, Philosophy, & Economics, 
14(2),	109–128.
56 Anomaly,	 J.,	 &	 Brennan,	 G.	 (2014).	 Social	 norms,	 the	 invisible	 hand,	 and	 the	 law.	
University of Queensland Law Journal, 33(2),	263–283.
57 Venter,	C.	(2013).	Life at the speed of light: From the double helix to the dawn of digital life. 
New	York:	Penguin.
58 Gutmann,	A.	 (2011).	The	ethics	of	 synthetic	biology:	Guiding	principles	 for	emerging	
technologies. Hastings Center Report, 41(4),	17–22.
59 Ellickson,	R.	(1994).	Order without law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
60 Flanigan,	J.	(2017).	Pharmaceutical freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
     |  89ANOMALY et AL.
But in many cases it will be the reverse and there are reasons to 
worry that giving regulators the power to micromanage procreative 
choices will leave some populations worse off than they would be 
with a greater degree of decentralized choice.
What	would	regulatory	parsimony	recommend	for	dilemmas	like	
those discussed above? Choices that merely alter what some believe 
to be the optimal ratio of traits in the population should be permitted 
unless they produce a clear, uncompensated harm. Laws will be un‐
necessary if social norms evolve that reward people who have chil‐
dren with cognitive traits that are socially beneficial. Such norms 
could evolve because, as a population becomes skewed so that cer‐
tain cognitive styles are both beneficial and scarce, parents might be 
more inclined to select children with these properties—in part be‐
cause they will be rewarded with more successful lives due to the 
fact that their skills are in demand. This seems to be true for sex se‐
lection,	at	least	in	Western	countries,	where	the	ability	to	choose	a	
child's sex doesn't seem to have resulted in any major imbalance and 
has been mainly chosen for purposes of family balancing.61 
More importantly, even if we can think of a hypothetical social 
optimum for a distribution of psychological traits and we agree on 
how to balance procreative beneficence and procreative altruism, it 
is not obvious that what experts come up with in estimating optimal‐
ity will be right or that people will listen to them.
When	in	doubt,	we	should	defer	to	the	wishes	of	parents,	as	they	
typically have better incentives than regulators to figure out what 
traits will make their children flourish. As most parents would not 
maliciously produce children with traits that threaten the welfare 
of future people it may be superfluous to enact bans on selecting 
for anti‐social traits. But if parents refuse to take their responsibil‐
ities seriously by considering how their failure to select or alter an 
embryo	might	 produce	 easily	 preventable	 harms	 to	 their	 child	 (or	
the	future	people	whose	welfare	their	child	will	affect),	then	it	may	
be	worth	implementing	regulations	that	limit	these	choices.	We	do	
not think free choices will always produce an optimal distribution of 
traits, and we are skeptical that a specific optimum exists, given rea‐
sonable diversity in the relative weight that different people place 
on widely shared values. But even if we could agree on a socially op‐
timal distribution of traits we worry that states would be unlikely to 
achieve this optimum by micromanaging the procreative choices of 
parents.	When	legal	regulations	are	appropriate	to	prevent	serious	
harms we think they should be broad in scope and few in number.
7  | CONCLUSION
Given	the	facts	of	scarcity	and	risk,	we	think	there	will	be	interesting	
trade‐offs when it comes to modifying genes associated with psy‐
chological	traits.	We	have	argued	that	as	different	traits	can	influ‐
ence individual happiness and collective prosperity we should pay 
attention to the kinds of choices that new gene‐editing techniques 
will make possible. In the short and medium term it is likely that 
choosing	a	partner	(or	sperm	and	egg	donor)	wisely	would	be	more	
effective and less risky than directly trying to edit genes to produce 
children with traits that are influenced by many genes interacting 
with each other. A lot of innovation in art and science depends on 
institutions,	not	(just)	genes.	But	to	the	extent	that	genes	influence	
who we are and what kinds of institutions we create there may be 
reasons to think about which social mechanisms we use for aggre‐
gating judgments, and which kinds of genetic enhancements might 
increase the welfare of each and the prosperity of all.
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